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Abstract 
Based on Mancur Olson’s and Robert Putnam’s theories, this article discusses 
whether it is more difficult to recruit volunteers in urban than in rural areas. We 
use data from the Danish Rural-Urban Barometer (2011/12), which contains 
2000 valid responses from urban and rural respondents. We show that, in the 
case of Denmark, rural dwellers actually do more volunteer work than city 
dwellers in an environment characterized by relatively more trust and solidarity 
within the local area. All things being equal, increased urbanisation will 
therefore in the long run reduce volunteerism and increase the relative number 
of Homo Oeconomicus at the expense of Homo Voluntarius and the rural idyll. 
Keywords: voluntary work, social trust, specific trust, solidarity, rural idyll 
 
1.0  Introduction 
1.1  Rural-Urban Differences 
Far back in history, crucial differences between rural and urban values and 
lifestyles have been assumed. Among ‘contrast theories’ (Pahl, 1966, p. 300) we 
find Tönnies’ distinction between Gemeinschaft, (i.e., a society characterised by 
a high degree of traditions and face-to-face interaction), and Gesellschaft, 
understood as a society characterised by formal roles and indirect interactions 
(Tönnies, 1887/1957). Equally influential is Durkheim’s (1893/1984) famous 
idea of a macro-historical transition from mechanical solidarity in primitive, 
traditional societies without division of labour to organic solidarity in more 
complex, modern societies with extensive division of labour. 
A third early description of the rural-urban antagonism is German sociologist 
Georg Simmel’s (1950) essay “The metropolis and mental life”, which offers a 
social psychological explanation. The sensory stimuli the villagers receive daily 
are characterised by their fast-paced, ever-changing and turbulent life, which 
makes them ‘distanced’ and ‘reserved’. In contrast, rural dwellers are 
characterised by ‘emotional relationships’ and ‘a slower, more habitual’ rhythm 
of life (Simmel, 1950, p. 409 ff.). 
In more recent times, American urban sociologist Louis Wirth (1938) has put 
forward the thesis that the larger the population size and density, the more 
division of labour, anonymity and impersonal relationships between people. This 
makes up the essence of a modern urban life. Conversely, a rural lifestyle is
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based on more traditional, positive values involving strong intra-group ties and 
local embeddedness. 
The idea of a ‘rural idyll’ versus rural deprivation has been further elaborated in 
the recent literature (Short, 2006). As argued by Michael Bunce, the ideal rural 
community “is an ideology which has its roots in the anti-urbanism and anti-
industrialism of the back-to-the-land movements of the early part of [the 20th] 
century” (Bunce, 1998, p. 241). 
Focus on the rural has often been neglected in contemporary policy-making 
when, for the first time in history, “the global urban population has surpassed 
that of the global rural population” (Pini, Moletsane, & Mills, 2014, p. 453). 
Thus, it is argued that rural issues have not been of national significance to, for 
example, contemporary Australia. We add to this literature by arguing that, in 
the case of a small Scandinavian welfare society such as Denmark, the 
countryside is indeed (still) an ‘idyll’ compared to the cities. This is true in terms 
of higher ability to self-organize by volunteering within local, rural communities 
characterized by, compared to the large cities, a higher level of life satisfaction 
as well as significantly higher levels of mutual trust, personal acquaintance and 
solidarity. 
In recent years the rural-urban dichotomy has been tested empirically, and 
overall, it seems to hold (Glenn & Alston, 1967; Cohen, 1982; Willits, Bealer, 
& Timbers, 1990; Bell, 1992; Cockfield & Botterill, 2012; Sørensen, 2012, 
2014). Moreover, specific trust and voluntary work tend to be more prevalent in 
rural than in urban areas, as demonstrated, for example, in the case of Denmark 
(Sørensen, 2014, 2015; Svendsen & Sørensen, 2007), a country that also 
historically has been characterised by strong rural, civic movements (Svendsen 
& Svendsen, 2004). Furthermore, a French study (Callois & Aubert, 2007) 
shows that both bridging and bonding social capital in rural areas–involving 
social and specific trust, respectively–are positively related to economic 
performance. In contrast, a study from the United States shows a decrease in 
small town social capital, including trust, density of networks, community 
participation and organization memberships–however not compared to urban 
areas (Besser, 2009). 
1.2  Trust and Free-Riding 
To sum up, rural-urban differences exist, but apart from applying the classic, and 
in some cases somewhat mythological, sociological theories, how can we 
explain these differences? What is their logic? We will here attempt to 
supplement the ‘contrast theories’ with another, possible explanation, namely 
that the excellence of volunteerism and self-organisation in rural areas compared 
to urban areas is related to trust and free-riding. Obviously, volunteers provide 
collective goods for an entire community via their activities, but they also face 
the incentive to ‘free-ride’ (Olson, 1965), where it is tempting to let others do 
the hard work. Normally, the total costs in terms of money and time far exceed 
the individual volunteer’s own private benefit. In other words, their large and 
altruistic efforts are not strictly ‘rational’ in a traditional economic sense. Still, 
it may be useful to uncover the incentive to free-ride, which is a constant enemy 
in all volunteers’ daily work, also when new volunteers have to be recruited. As 
such, trust and free-riding should be seen as two sides of the same coin. Where 
a high level of trust in a group hampers harmful free-riding and encourages 
volunteerism through both positive and negative, social sanctions, low trust 
allows for free-riding, which again reduces volunteerism. 
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Of course cities may also be divided into smaller communities, either place 
based or communities of interest. Furthermore, when the size of a community 
makes regular face-to-face interaction impossible, the community may then be 
‘imagined’ (Anderson, 1991). Still, we address the physical reality in this paper, 
simply arguing that the likelihood of repeated social interaction between the 
same individuals is arguably higher in an environment that physically defines a 
small group (the village) compared to the larger group (the city). 
With this in mind, we present a rural-urban comparison to shed new light on the 
volunteers’ work and highlight their altruistic efforts, considering that they could 
have done other things such as working late hours in paid jobs. Free-riding 
definitely deserves more attention in the literature on volunteerism and, as we 
will argue, a comparison between urban and rural Denmark may shed fresh light 
on the matter. Our main question is: How does free-riding affect volunteerism 
in the city and the village? 
1.3  Outline 
In Section 2.0 we define various forms of trust and discuss the linkage between 
trust and social sanctions, which helps to secure social order. Then, in Section 
3.0 we explore how trust should be seen as an important part of the incentive 
structure of Homo Voluntarius, making people contribute and not free-ride 
although the latter appears most economically rational. In Section 4.0 we turn to 
Homo Oeconomicus and the free-riding problem based on public choice theory. 
Here, theory predicts that Homo Voluntarius is more likely to thrive in the 
village–as characterised by more trust among locals–than in the city, where 
Homo Oeconomicus seems to prevail. In Section 5.0 this theoretical expectation 
is confirmed by empirical evidence in the form of Danish survey data. The final 
section 6.0 concludes. 
2.0  Trust and Social Sanctions 
2.1  Social, Moralistic and Specific Trust 
Trust means to be vulnerable, because you can never be one hundred percent 
sure that you can trust another person. As stated by Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & 
Camerer (1998), trust is “a psychological state comprising the intention to accept 
vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behaviors of 
another” (p. 395). In other words, when we trust, it is always at the risk of an 
economic, social or emotional cost. 
In the literature, we find many forms of trust. Social trust is defined as the 
expectation that a given informal (non-recorded) standard is respected. Social 
trust deviates fundamentally from specific trust, that is, trust to a specific other 
whom you know personally. This is because social trust is extended to people 
about whom the trusting party does not have any direct information. As pointed 
out by Uslaner (2002), like specific trust social trust is experience-based. 
However it is deeply rooted in moralistic trust, which is trust in the form of a 
cultural value that we learn through socialization from early childhood and 
which, to a large extent, determines our worldview for the rest of our lives. 
Also, specifically within rural studies, there has in recent years been an 
increasing focus on the importance of trust, ranging from food assurance (e.g. 
Hinrichs 2000; Eden, Bear, & Walker, 2008; Thorsø & Kjeldsen, 2015), the 
impact of livestock diseases on trust (Palmer, Fozdar, & Sully, 2009; Scott & 
Midmore, 2004), environmental problems connected to collective action 
problems (e.g. Graham, 2014; Mariola, 2012), information dissemination and 
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social networks among farmers (e.g. Koutsou, Partalidou, & Athanasious 2014; 
Fisher, 2013; Sligo & Massey, 2007), rural libraries as hotbeds of trust and social 
capital (Svendsen, 2013), agricultural change in central and eastern Europe 
(Slangen, Kooten, & Suchánek, 2004), community resilience (e.g. Skerratt, 
2013) to the importance of personal and institutional trust among elders in Wales 
(Curry & Fisher, 2012). 
2.2  Trust and Social Sanctions 
Regardless of how trust is formed, the consequence of trust and trustworthiness 
is less crime, less free-riding and fewer breaches of contracts. In other words, an 
informal agreement emerges when cheating is punished with social exclusion.  
As physical meeting places, voluntary associations can help reduce the free-
riding problem via a tit-for-tat strategy. In a tit-for-tat strategy, an agent 
cooperates in the first game and then copies the second agent’s moves in the next 
(Axelrod, 1984). If the second agent chooses not to cooperate in the first game, 
the first agent will copy this move and play non-cooperation in the second game. 
In other words, if you have been cheated by someone in the soccer club, you can 
refuse to cooperate with that person the next time you show up for training and 
tell the others about what has happened. In addition to the cost in terms of 
reputation effect and lack of future cooperation, the first player can also impose 
an extra cost on the second player by scolding him. 
This can be very unpleasant for the breaker of informal rules, since the social 
network can implement informal sanctions for ‘bad’ behaviour and being ‘a bad 
boy’, which may contribute to educate this ‘bad boy’ and change his future 
behaviour. Furthermore, agents with a bad reputation will not have access to 
future resources and information in other social networks, which will reduce 
future net gains. Just as a person has an incentive to build a good reputation in 
order to work with others in the future, companies will invest in brands to gain 
the consumers’ loyalty and trust (Cook, Hardin, & Levi, 2005). 
An example of social punishment is a used car dealer who cheats a customer. He 
will risk being scolded by the customer, face a loss in reputation and fewer 
people will want to buy a used car from him. The customers lose trust in the 
dealer, and trust is rather important in this business since most people cannot 
judge whether a used car is a heap of junk. Examples from associations are 
treasurers who steal from the till, or parents who promise to assist scout leaders 
or soccer coaches but let them down and leave them feeling cheated and 
exploited. Trust, that is, the expectation of not being cheated, compensates for 
asymmetric information so that, for example, parents and voluntary leaders can 
better work together (Ostrom & Ahn, 2009; Hillman, 2009). 
In sum, extra social costs can be imposed on those who do not cooperate and 
attempt to free-ride–that is, Homo Oeconomicus types, who wish to enjoy 
various goods for free, without contributing to provide them. Conversely, social 
reward is a roaring success for a Homo Voluntarius, a ‘hard-rider’ so to speak 
(Svendsen & Svendsen, 2016)–everything is great, and she or he gets high on 
oxytocin, the ‘happiness hormone’ which is released in the body when you help 
others and obtain social recognition. Besides this, praising of the Homo 
Voluntarius in public also sends a clear message about what good behaviour is 
(Poulsen & Svendsen, 2005). 
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3.0  Homo Voluntarius 
3.1  The Socio-Economic Importance of Social Trust 
What are the incentives for a Homo Voluntarius who, in contrast to traditional 
rational actor theories, refrains from free-riding? A common explanation is 
impact from culture, here not least the civic society. Thus, rich traditions of civic 
engagement, including voluntary associations, can be seen as a precondition for 
socializing citizens into Homines Voluntarii and hence builders of socio-
economically beneficial social capital, as set forth by Robert D. Putnam. Putnam 
indeed sees cooperative social networks as a capital both for individuals, 
communities and whole societies, just like economic, physical and human capital. 
This is because widespread network cooperation leads not only to private goods 
but also, due to a kind of spillover effect, the shared goods of norms of reciprocity 
and social trust (Putnam 2000, p. 19). Social interaction across group cleavages 
simply ‘lubricates’ society, as “a society that relies on generalised reciprocity is 
more efficient than a distrustful society, for the same reason that money is more 
efficient than barter. Trust lubricates social life” (Putnam, Leonardi, & Nanetti 
1993, p. 3). 
Putnam’s idea is in short that social trust is created through voluntary 
organisations. When people voluntarily come together in groups, face-to-face 
interactions build specific trust, which then spreads to the surrounding 
community as social trust. For example, being a scout is a face-to-face activity. 
The participants have to actively move out into the public domain and thereby 
achieve social contacts with other scouts. Informal meetings at the scout hut or 
camp can be just as important for building and maintaining social networks as 
involvement in professional or political organisations (cf. Putnam, Leonardi, & 
Nanetti, 1993; Putnam, 2000).  
For example, in his comparison of Northern and Southern Italy, Putnam 
concludes that the density of voluntary associations is higher in the North than 
in the South due to historical differences in the hierarchical structure of society. 
Examples of voluntary associations are homeowners’ associations, glee clubs, 
coops, sports clubs, religious societies, literary societies, guilds and trade unions. 
Putnam’s explanation is that Northern and Southern Italy chose different paths 
already in the 11th century and that the South subjected itself to a hierarchical 
Norman empire around 1100. That type of authoritarian society reduces trust in 
leaders. Common people and leaders have no social relations and therefore do not 
generate social capital. This is why Southern Italy is experiencing the Hobbesian 
outcome, namely ineffective government, corruption, lawlessness, mafia 
dominance, economic problems and so on. The solution to this ‘southern logjam’ 
would be to limit the hierarchical state’s interference and make room for voluntary 
associations as trust creating institutions in civic society. 
With regard to his own country, the USA, Putnam explains the quite dramatic 
drop in social trust with the fact that around 2000, the post-war generations spent 
their free time in front of the TV rather than in voluntary associations where they 
could generate and preserve trust. Putnam (2000) laconically sums up the 
phenomenon as a ‘privatisation of leisure time’–which today comprises time 
spent in front of a variety of electronic screens like cell phones, computers, 
playstations, iPads, etc. 
In this line of thought, an important public arena for formation of trust in a young 
person is arguably voluntary associations where people from all social groups 
meet, get to know each other, and learn to cooperate. In other words, like Stolle & 
Hooghe (2004) we hypothesise that trust formation in young people is, to some 
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degree at least, correlated with their active engagement in voluntary associations, 
including voluntary work. This is also consistent with studies of the Long Civic 
Generation in the USA, i.e. the generation of Americans who were young in the 
1950s and 1960s. These people were engaged in civic movements and never 
stopped being engaged in voluntary associations (Putnam, 2000). 
3.2  Trust and Voluntary Work: The case of Denmark 
As can be seen in the World values surveys, Denmark–together with the other 
Scandinavian countries–has one of the highest social trust levels in the world. 
This may partially explain the country’s wealth (Bjørnskov, 2009). 
Denmark is sometimes called ‘the Associational country of Denmark’ 
(foreningslandet Danmark). As argued by Putnam, such historical development 
of civil society matters to the level of social trust today. Thus, the Danish 
cooperative movement, which took off from the mid-1860s, and Denmark’s 
associational life can be claimed to be important hotbeds for the creation of trust 
(Svendsen & Svendsen 2000, 2004; Chloupkova, Svendsen, & Svendsen, 2004). 
Other examples are voluntary organisations formed with the purpose of 
constructing sports halls and culture houses, parents’ transportation of kids to 
sports, and voluntary involvement in sports clubs in general. Danes’ voluntary 
organisation makes it more difficult to cheat each other, because you meet your 
fellow citizens every week in the choral society, in the tennis club or wherever 
it may be. It becomes unpleasant in the long run for those who do not keep their 
word, in particular when everybody knows about it. The other side of the coin is 
that when you meet many nice people in the tennis club who show good 
behaviour and are trustworthy, you take this experience with you when you meet 
new people. In other words, ‘ideological’ moralistic trust is confirmed in your 
daily life, when you actually experience that your co-citizens generally can be 
trusted, something that makes you remain a social truster. 
All this makes ‘Associational Denmark’ an interesting laboratory where we 
can study the Danish way of organising in voluntary associations up close. A 
popular saying is that when two Danes meet they shake hands; when three 
Danes meet they form an association! Civic engagement as an explanation of 
trust finds support in this deep-rooted Danish tradition of engagement in 
voluntary associations that help to socialize kids into being social trusters and 
Homines Voluntarii. 
In fact, in Denmark particular traditions for youth engagement have been 
developed, rooting back in the so-called youth movement of the 19th century 
(Svendsen & Svendsen, 2004). Such participation is clearly a win-win 
situation. Society gains when young people are socialised into contributing to 
society–and most probably will feel a life-long obligation to do so–and young 
people will profit, e.g. by extending their social network, learning important 
things about formal and informal rules in society, trusting and being 
trustworthy, or finding a job. 
In sum, we suggest Homo Voluntarius as a term for a person that needs to be 
able to trust others, and be trusted, and in doing so becomes a social capitalist 
who–when providing private goods for him- or herself, such as connections, 
good reputation, social recognition and human capital–at the same time provides 
collective goods that can be enjoyed by all, such as shared norms of cooperation, 
trust and various fruits of civic engagement and volunteering. 
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4.0  Homo Oeconomicus: Free-riding 
4.1  Mancur Olson: The Free-Rider Problem 
The idea of economic man, Homo Oeconomicus, originates in Adam Smith’s 
famous book Wealth of Nations from 1776. In an example, the baker gets up 
early in the morning to bake bread for others for his own gain rather than to 
please others (Smith, 1976). The baker is profit maximising just as any other 
business actor in the market. Ideology, sense of community, or ethics play no 
role in this connection. 
Offhand, we might think that people would join together voluntarily when they 
have a shared goal. However, the free-riding problem arises every time two or 
more people pursue a common goal, a collective good. A collective good means 
that all members of a particular group receive the good whether they contribute 
or not. The incentive to ‘sit on the fence’ is simply too great. Most parents in the 
sports club appreciate the sporting event; they know that it is a great experience 
for their children. Still, they hold back and hope that ‘others’ will do the work 
so that they don’t have to. So because no-one can be excluded from consuming 
the good and join a club, it seems economically rational not to contribute. 
Mancur Olson, who introduced the modern understanding of the free-rider 
behaviour in his famous book The Logic of Collective Action from 1965, argued 
that the size of a group conditions the ability to organise and for example initiate 
voluntary cooperation in a group (Olson, 1965). His distinction between small 
and large groups is central (Congleton 2015). Who will take the initiative to do 
something? Can we hide in a large group or do we stand up front and therefore 
cannot refuse? 
4.2  Example: Establishing a Soccer Club 
Let us take a look at potential winners and losers among volunteers in terms of 
group size. Assume, for instance, that we compare the citizens’ incentive to 
volunteer in a large city and in a village. Let us say that the large city has 1 
million inhabitants, the village 1000 and, importantly, the volunteers are not 
organised beforehand. Where is someone most likely to take the initiative to 
solve the collective action problem of starting some volunteer work for the 
common good? Who takes the initiative to start a soccer club or arrange a large 
sports event to please the local children and young people? 
Assume that a voluntarily run soccer club will create an added value for the city 
and for the village of €5 million per year (in the form of improved health, fewer 
sick days, network formation, better information, trust formation, advertising, 
increased local turnover, etc.). Assume also, to make it as simple as possible, 
that the total cost of organising and establishing a soccer club in the city and in 
the village amounts to €40,000 to the initiator to make up for lost earnings and 
less free time. The benefits per inhabitant now become more concentrated in the 
village than in the city, and this is exactly why it makes more sense to become a 
volunteer in the village (see Table 1). 
As Table 1 shows, the individual inhabitant in the city will get a negative net 
profit of -€39,995 by volunteering to establish the soccer club, even though all 
1 million inhabitants as a group will earn €5 million. In the example, the overall 
profit of €5 million per inhabitant is far higher than the initiator’s overall cost of 
€ 40,000. The result is that without organisation and sharing of the total costs, 
the collective good in the form of a soccer club will not be provided in the large 
group of inhabitants and possible volunteers. The incentive to free-ride is too 
great in relation to the private profit for the individual volunteer. 
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Table 1.  Volunteering and group size 
 City 
(large group) 
Village 
(small group) 
Number (group size) 1 mil. 1,000 
Total profit 5 mil. € 5 mil. € 
Individual profit 5 € 50,000 € 
Total costs 40,000 € 40,000 € 
Individual net profit 5-40,000 € = -39,995 € 50,000 €-40,000 € = 
10,000 € 
In comparison, things will get done in the relatively small group of 1000 
inhabitants where the individual person has an interest in doing something on 
their own. The 1000 villagers thus earn €50,000 each. The costs of establishing 
the soccer club are the same as above, i.e. €40,000, but here it is worthwhile for 
individuals to act on their own, even without organisation. An individual profit 
of €50,000 minus the costs of €40,000 amounts to a positive net profit of 
€10,000. The incentive to establish the soccer club is therefore greater in the 
village than in the city. In addition, the villagers will have a stronger incentive 
to gather, form a working group and share the costs of establishing the club, 
which will subsequently result in even larger net profits for the individual 
villager. Olson’s group size logic thus demonstrates how we can expect a 
stronger incentive to volunteer in the smaller group than in the larger group and 
thus a smaller risk of free-riding. 
As will be seen in the following, our results indicate that we should expect 
personal acquaintance and solidarity within the local community to decrease 
significantly with the degree of urbanisation: The more inhabitants, the less 
local, solidarity and participation. All in all, our numbers thus indicate–in 
accordance with the Danish values studies and international studies–that group 
size actually matters for participation. It is clearly more common to be a free-
rider in the largest cities, whereas inhabitants in the least populated areas can 
claim the largest engagement in terms of membership of local associations and 
volunteering (see e.g., Sørensen, 2012; Svendsen & Svendsen, 2014). 
Still, our data show a considerable level of local volunteerism in the largest 
Danish cities–more than Olson’s theory predicts. The reason could be the 
existing stock of moralistic trust (Uslaner, 2002) among Danes, which sustains 
social trust and, in general, Homo Voluntarius ideals, and therefore reduces the 
incentive for free-riding and self-interested behaviour.  
5.0  Rural–Urban Differences in Denmark 
5.1  The Danish Rural–Urban Barometer 
Since group size is relevant, a first operationalisation could be to examine 
whether there are differences between rural and urban Denmark. Offhand, the 
expectation is that since the number of inhabitants is larger in cities than in small 
towns, there are relatively more volunteers in the small towns due to a smaller 
incentive to free-ride. 
Tables 2–4 below draw on the Danish Rural–Urban Barometer (DRUB) 
(Sørensen, 2014, 2015; Svendsen & Svendsen, 2014). This questionnaire survey 
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was conducted in December 2011 and January 2012 and contained 2000 valid 
responses from urban and rural respondents. 
The comparison of rural and urban zones is based on three categories: areas with 
less than 5001 inhabitants; areas with 5001–100,000 inhabitants; and areas with 
over 100,000 inhabitants. Since 4.6 percent of the respondents did not answer 
the question about number of inhabitants in their area, we only use responses 
from 1908 respondents. The average age is 54 for the 840 respondents in areas 
with less than 5001 inhabitants, 53 for the 837 respondents in areas with 5001–
100,000 inhabitants, and 47 for the 231 respondents in areas with over 100,000 
inhabitants. 
First, to ascertain whether the framework conditions for voluntary work and–in 
general–procurement of common goods even exists, we will look at how people 
thrive where they live. The next point is how many local associations the 
respondents are members of, their participation in voluntary work in their local 
area and how many hours of voluntary work they perform in their local area. 
Finally, we will examine whether possible differences are reflected in the degree 
of fellowship. Note that the numbers only concern participation in the local 
community, so we cannot say whether the situation is different for associational 
participation in general. 
5.2  Survey Results 
In some countries there is a paradoxical gap between the image of rural areas 
held by common citizens, and the image produced by the media. In general, 
surveys show that ordinary citizens–rural as well as urban–have an 
overwhelmingly positive picture of rural lifestyles and values (e.g. Willits et al., 
1990; Cockfield & Botterill, 2012). Conversely, the media in many countries 
stress the negative stereotypes of rural life. In Denmark, for example, negative 
terms like Peripheral Denmark, The Rotten Banana and Outskirt Denmark are 
common (Winther & Svendsen, 2012). Whose picture should we believe? Is life 
really so bad out there? 
Table 2.  Agreement to two statements about life satisfaction. Source: Danish 
Rural-Urban Barometer, 2011 
 
 
Number of 
respondents* 
I thrive where I live Percentage ‘Fully 
agree’ 
 
Below 5,001 citizens 86 840 
5,001-100,000 citizens 88 837 
Above 100,000 citizens 85 231 
I am happy with my life at the 
moment 
Average 
1-10 scale 
 
Below 5,001 citizens 8,68 839 
5,001-100,000 citizens 8,65 833 
Above 100,000 citizens 8,43 229 
*Don’t know, answers are not included. 
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Table 2 illustrates the level of well-being and life satisfaction. As we can see, 
the three categories are fairly similar. Inhabitants in the least populated areas 
score a little higher on well-being, and inhabitants in the largest cities are a little 
less satisfied with life than the other citizens. 
Table 3 shows the average number of memberships of local associations. 
Respondents in areas with less than 5001 inhabitants are members of almost 
twice as many local associations than inhabitants in the largest cities, and the 
share of persons who are members of a local association is significantly higher 
in the rural areas than in the cities. 
Table 3.  Answers to three questions on associational membership and work 
for voluntary associations in the local area. Source: Danish Rural-Urban 
Barometer, 2011 
How many 
associations are you a 
member of in your 
local area? 
Average number 
of associations 
Percentage who 
are member of 
one or more 
associations 
Number of 
respondents* 
Below 5,001 citizens 1.37 66 839 
5,001-100,000 citizens 1.12 59 836 
Above 100,000 citizens 0.79 42 230 
    
During the last 12 
months, for how many 
voluntary associations 
have you done 
voluntary work in 
your local area?  
Average number 
of associations 
Percentage who 
have done work 
for one or more 
associations 
Number of 
respondents* 
Below 5,001 citizens 1.81 46 383 
5,001-100,000 citizens 1.56 37 308 
Above 100,000 citizens 1.37 29 67 
    
During the last 12 
months, how many 
hours a month have 
you spent on voluntary 
work for associations 
in your local area?  
Average number 
of hours 
 
Number of 
respondents* 
Below 5,001 citizens 15.95  351 
5,001-100,000 citizens 15.16  288 
Above 100,000 citizens 14.04  57 
*Don’t know answers are not included. 
Another relevant question is how many of these associations have had voluntary 
work performed for them. According to Table 3, inhabitants in the smallest 
villages have volunteered for more associations than inhabitants in the large 
cities. Moreover, the share of local citizens who volunteer increases the fewer 
inhabitants there are. 
Another indicator of rural and urban volunteerism is how many hours the 
respondents who confirmed that they volunteer in an association actually spend 
on their voluntary work. As Table 3 demonstrates, the difference is not 
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overwhelming, but voluntary engagement in the local community drops as the 
degree of urbanisation rises. 
5.3  Social and Specific Trust In Rural and Urban Areas 
Social capital and the ability to cooperate with people in general are difficult to 
measure in practice. The concept is therefore operationalised primarily as social 
trust as trust can be defined as the expectation that a given norm is respected, 
something that obviously makes cooperation smoother and, hence, increases 
network resources. As we mentioned, this includes the vulnerability that 
naturally arises when you voluntarily risk that the norm is not respected and that 
your trust is betrayed. The risk of vulnerability and pain caused by a breach of 
trust has been called ‘the price of trust’ (Barbalet 2009, p. 369). 
We stated earlier that social trust deviates fundamentally from specific trust 
because it is expanded to include people, whom the trusting party does not know 
and therefore does not have much information about. Social trust in non-specific 
persons (strangers) is typically measured via questions about whether a person 
finds that most people can be trusted–a standard measure that has proven to be a 
consistent measure in worldwide surveys during the last 60 years. Trust in most 
(but not all) persons under most (but not all) circumstances simply means that 
we are optimistic enough to trust most strangers (Uslaner 2015, p. 73). Social 
trust thus says something about the likelihood of being cheated and consequently 
about the ability to cooperate. The smaller the risk of being cheated and hurt by 
breach of trust, the easier it is to cooperate with a stranger about whom you do 
not have full information. This also makes it easier to cooperate informally 
(Paldam & Svendsen, 2000). 
Table 4 shows that 85 percent of the respondents from the big cities indicated 
that other people can generally be trusted compared to approximately 75 percent 
of the respondents in the two other categories. This difference between the level 
of social trust in rural and urban areas is, however, not significant. When 
applying a Wald-test to test whether there is a significant difference between the 
reference point in category 1 (village) and category 3 (city), there is no 
significant difference. 
The fact that this difference is not statistically significant corresponds to earlier 
studies in Denmark. One explanation is that Danes are generally very trustful–
regardless of where they live; another explanation is that this question is a poor 
measure for regional differences in social capital in a country (Sørensen, Svendsen, 
& Jensen 2011).  
Rather, we may expect that the smaller group size in the rural areas makes it 
relatively easier to detect and punish free-riders and to reward people who do 
not cheat–and in this way educate other local people in ‘good behaviour’ by 
repeated face-to-face interaction. We might therefore expect that specific trust 
rather than social trust prevails in rural areas (where most local people know 
each other beforehand) compared to big cities (where most people do not know 
each other beforehand). 
Concerning the second question about the respondents’ specific trust in their 
neighbours, 81 percent of respondents from cities above 100,000 fully agreed, 
compared to 90 percent from villages below 5,001 citizens. Here, the distance 
from the village as reference is 7.1 percentage points. Note that when the 
distance coefficient increases, this means that trust decreases, as the scale from 
0 –100 is defined as 0 indicating high trust and 100 no trust. A similar result is 
found for trusting people in the local area. Here 77 percent of the urbanites fully 
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agreed, while 85 percent of the village dwellers did the same. The distance to 
reference is 6.3 percentage points higher if you live in the city. 
Table 4.  Agreement to five statements about trust and the local community. 
Source: Danish Rural-Urban Barometer, 2011 
 Pct. 
‘Fully 
agree’ 
Num-
ber of 
respon-
dents 
Linear 
Regres-
sion 
(OLS) 
Wald-test 
(Category 
1 and 3) 
Distance to 
Reference 
(in pct. 
points) 
Most people can be 
trusted    0.1506  
Below 5,001 citizens 
(Reference) 76 819    
 5,001-100,000 
citizens 75 825 0.041   
 Above 100,000 
citizens 85 226 0.011   
I trust my 
neighbours    
 
0.000*** 
 
7.1 
Below 5,001 citizens 
(Reference) 90 734    
5,001-100,000 
citizens 86 801 1.502   
 Above 100,000 
citizens 81 217 7.073***   
I trust people in the 
local area    
 
0.000*** 
 
6.3 
Below 5,001 citizens 
(Reference) 85 798    
5,001-100,000 
citizens 79 763 2.983   
Above 100,000 
citizens 77 207 6.304***   
All people in the 
local area know each 
other 
   
 
0.000*** 
 
34.5 
Below 5,001 citizens 
(Reference) 38 837    
5,001-100,000 
citizens 20 833 14.526***   
Above 100,000 
citizens 8 231 34.531***   
I feel strong 
solidarity with 
others in the local 
area 
   
 
0.000*** 
 
16.4 
Below 5,001 citizens 
(Reference) 47 836    
5,001-100,000 
citizens 37 833 6.260***   
Above 100,000 
citizens 19 231 16.396***   
Note: p < 0.001 ***, p < 0.01 **, p< 0.05*. Variables 84 and 85 have been rescaled from 1-4 to 
0-100 while variables 42 and 44 have been rescaled from 1-5 to 0-100. 0 indicates a high degree 
of trust/solidarity while 100 indicates no trust/solidarity. Don’t know answers are not included. 
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Is the smaller voluntary effort in the largest cities also reflected in a less close-
knit local community? Indeed it is. Table 4 shows two indicators. The first one 
is a question about the extent to which the respondents agree that almost 
everybody knows each other in the local community. Here the difference 
between village and city is 30 percentage points and, as can be seen, this 
difference is highly statistically significant. Now the distance from the village as 
reference point amounts to 34.5 percentage points. So living in the city clearly 
reduces the relative likelihood of knowing all people in the local area. 
The last question in Table 4 asks whether people feel a strong solidarity with 
others in their community. Here, we find a 28 percentage point gap between 
village and city. This difference is highly significant too, reflected in a 16.4 
percentage point distance to reference. The overall result is that for all variables, 
except social trust, living in a village has a highly significant, positive impact, 
namely on specific trust, mutual acquaintance as well as on solidarity. Hence, 
local engagement and volunteering seems to be fostered in close-knit local 
communities rich on social capital. 
6.0  Conclusion 
The main question was how free-riding affects volunteerism in the city and the 
village. The theoretical expectation based on Homo Oeconomicus and Mancur 
Olson’s theory was that it would be more difficult to recruit volunteers in large 
groups (e.g. in large cities) than in small groups (in rural areas). Conversely, 
based on Robert Putnam’s theory we expected that social trust in the Danish 
society as a whole would reduce the incentive to free-ride. In this line of thought 
one would expect that Homo Voluntarius citizens socialised into civicness from 
early childhood would not be eliminated, which then would erase differences 
between rural and urban Denmark. We found that people in rural areas 
performed more voluntary associational work in their local communities than 
city dwellers. Olson’s group size theory could explain this phenomenon, since 
the incentive to free-ride in small groups is smaller, because the benefits of 
procuring a collective good, for example a soccer club, are more concentrated 
on fewer individuals. However, volunteerism is also quite widespread in the 
Danish cities. Strong informal rules encourage dialogue and cooperation among 
the locals, whether they live in an area with high or low population density. 
Group size, repeated face-to-face interaction and social control matters! Our 
data, however, also showed that personal acquaintance, solidarity, life 
satisfaction, fellowship and specific trust is significantly stronger in small, local 
communities in rural areas than in large cities, whereas social trust–which roots 
in ‘ideological’ moralistic trust–is a little more widespread among urbanites. It 
is therefore important to secure this civic engagement and inherent social control 
by stimulating voluntary work in the future rather than putting the associations 
on the dole and thus threatening an autonomous and economically independent 
tradition–a tradition that, in the case of Denmark and many other countries, dates 
back to a gloriously ‘civic’ 19th century. In other words, social trust is a fortunate 
by-product of other people’s actions, in particular the species of Homines 
Voluntarii. But if volunteering in associations stops, there is a risk that mutual 
trust among local people will be negatively affected since the two most probably 
go hand in hand. Thus, increased urbanisation will, all things being equal, reduce 
volunteerism, specific trust and solidarity within the local area due to the free-
rider problem. In this way, we may risk that the relative number of Homines 
Oeconomici will increase at the expense of Homines Voluntarii and thus, in the 
longer run, threaten to transform the rural idyll into ancient hotbeds for civic 
engagement and social capital. 
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